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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I assess the charges raised in Hans Lindahl’s book on the Fault Lines of Globalization 
against Habermas’ discourse theory of law. I argue, first, that Habermas does not construe legal 
norms as ‘top down’ positivizations of a given set of substantial moral norms. Discourse theory pro-
vides, rather, a constructivist account of both legal and moral norms as constructed through actual 
and bottom-up discourses between concrete human beings. Next, I emphasize that this discursive 
construction is an open-ended process of which the (temporary) outcomes contain much more con-
tingency than Lindahl is prepared to acknowledge. In the final section, I focus more directly on 
Lindahl’s own normative position and raise a few critical questions regarding the relationship be-
tween normativity and contingency in the theory of a-legality. 
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1. Introduction 
In his book on the Fault Lines of Globalization,1 Hans Lindahl presents us with a pow-
erful and sophisticated analysis of the nature of legal orders. By developing the con-
cept of ‘a-legality’, Lindahl thereby aims to bring into focus the contingency that 
necessarily underlies and constitutes every legal order. A-legality is used to refer to 
actions which put into question the existing distinctions between the legal and the il-
legal. In contrast with the illegality of illegal acts, which still confirm the legal order 
as it is, the a-legal reveals the contingency of the prevalent legal categorizations. As 
Lindahl explains, the a-legal is an ‘interruption of legal order’ which ‘disrupts the 
conditions of legal intelligibility of the situation’ and which ‘denotes the experience of 
                                           
1 Simple page references in between brackets are references to this book. 
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estrangement’ (p. 38). He thereby distinguishes between a ‘weak’ and a ‘strong’ dimen-
sion of the a-legal. In their weak dimension, a-legal actions make the boundaries of 
the legal order appear as ‘limits’, which ‘bespeak a gap between extant legal empow-
erments and those practical possibilities which are unrealized but realizable by the 
collective’. In their strong dimension, a-legal actions reveal a more radical contingen-
cy by making the boundaries appear as ‘normative fault lines’, which ‘mark the gap 
between the practical possibilities accessible to a collective and practical possibilities 
which are inaccessible to it’ (p. 176). 
Throughout his book, Lindahl presents his own analysis of the (contingent) nor-
mativity and (contingent) rationality of legal orders as a critique of some predomi-
nant views which analyze the rationality of legal orders in terms of ‘justification’, ‘de-
liberation’ and  ‘reciprocity’. This critique thereby targets philosophers such as John 
Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Philip Pettit and others (pp. 133-134). The main charge, 
most explicitly elaborated in the final chapter of the book, is that these theorists fail 
to fully understand the contingency of all legal rationality and that, as a result, the 
idealized presupposition of ‘reciprocity’ leads to a premature normative closure of the 
legal order. 
In this contribution I will not deal with all of the authors targeted by Lindahl, 
but simply focus on the work of Jürgen Habermas. My aim is to assess to what extent 
the charges raised against Habermas’ discourse theory of law as developed, mainly, in 
his book Between Facts and Norms (1996), are indeed legitimate. My assessment will 
thereby proceed in three steps. In the first section I argue that Lindahl often miscon-
strues Habermas’ discourse theory of law: legal norms should not be seen as ‘top 
down’ positivizations of a given set of substantial moral norms. Discourse theory pro-
vides, rather, a constructivist account of both legal and moral norms whereby these 
norms are constructed through actual and bottom-up discourses between concrete 
human beings facing specific problems within their actual life world. In the second 
section, I emphasize that the discursive construction of norms is an open-ended pro-
cess of which the (temporary) outcomes contain much more contingency than 
Habermas’ critics are usually prepared to acknowledge. In the third and final section, 
I focus more directly on Lindahl’s own normative position and raise a few critical 
questions regarding the relationship between normativity and contingency in the 
theory of a-legality. 
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2. The legal order as embedded in the lifeworld 
 
In the first chapter of his book, Lindahl emphasizes that legal orders should be under-
stood against the background of the normativity inherent in our social world. 
(…) legal orders draw on and come to stand out against the background of a 
more or less anonymous form of normativity, a normativity in which interaction 
precedes the reflexive operation whereby a manifold of individuals refer to them-
selves as a ‘we’ who act together, such that paying at the check-out point is simp-
ly what ‘one’ does. (…) In this sense, a pre-reflexive and post-reflexive normativi-
ty are interwoven in the scenario under discussion. I will refer to this kind of pre- 
and post-reflexive interaction as social interaction, and to the manifold of indi-
viduals who interact in this way as society. (p. 25) 
This quote is interesting because it reveals – pace Lindahl – important affinities 
with Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984/1987). In this fa-
mous theory, Habermas analyzes human interaction as essentially norm-guided 
whereby the norms regulating our behavior are mostly implicit and generally agreed 
to. It is only in (exceptional) cases of conflict and disagreement that the underlying 
norms become the topic of an (ideally reasonable) deliberation in which agreement is 
restored. In traditional societies, the normative framework endorsing human societies 
is still inextricably moral, legal and religious at the same time. It is only in the course 
of modernization that these different spheres are gradually disentangled and that in 
all of these spheres norms become increasingly formal and rationalized. Nevertheless, 
even in modern societies, the moral and the legal order should be understood as 
emerging from within a given lifeworld, whereby discursive attempts at moral or legal 
rationalization and justification always necessarily remain local in the sense that they 
arise in response to some local disagreement regarding specific norms. The idea of jus-
tifying or rationalizing the lifeworld as a whole is thereby utterly meaningless. 
In view of this theoretical background, some of Lindahl’s criticisms seem mis-
guided. At one point, he argues that an approach to practical rationality in terms of 
justification and deliberation is both abstract and reductive. 
 
Abstract, because it focuses on a legal order as a set of norms, bracketing le-
gal order as a concrete normative whole organized as an interconnected distribu-
tion of spatial, temporal, subjective and material dimensions. Reductive, because 
the standard approach has legal rationality beginning when a norm of action is 
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questioned, whereas rationality is no less effectual in the ordinary course of joint 
action under law. (p. 134) 
Habermas’ view of the legal order is neither abstract nor reductive in this sense. 
For him, modern law provides a more sophisticated way of solving the increasingly 
challenging problem of social integration in highly complex and pluralistic modern 
societies. Law thereby forms an extension and threefold ‘functional complement’ of 
morality in the sense that the legal system allows for the proper institutionalization of 
moral discourse (cognitive complement), for the proper incentives for citizens to be-
have in certain ways (motivational complement) as well as for the realization of our 
moral duties in the context of large scale societies (organizational complement). 
(Habermas 1996, pp. 114-118). Because legal discourse, thus understood, is simply a 
particular manifestation of the discursive structure of all social integration, the legal 
order is a normative order embedded within a concrete lifeworld and characterized by 
an intrinsic form of communicative rationality. 
As becomes clearer in the final chapter, Lindahl seems to work with a mistaken 
picture of Habermasian practical rationality as ‘substantial’ and ‘top down’. The as-
sumption seems to be that Habermas provides us with a substantial set of fundamen-
tal normative or moral expectations which provide the given and unquestionable 
background against which normative differences should be discursively settled (p. 
228). These moral expectations are supposedly captured by a moral set of human 
rights which are subsequently ‘positivized’ as fundamental (legal) rights (pp. 242-
243). 
This picture, however, misses the constructivist nature of both Habermas’ moral 
and legal theory. Although there is, indeed, a ‘substantial’ moral core in Habermas – 
referring to the need to equally respect the autonomy of all individuals –, this core is 
very general and abstract and does not automatically translate into some set of norms 
or human rights (Rummens 2007, Gilabert 2005). It is only through an actual process 
of deliberation that individuals can ‘construct’ specific norms which ideally give equal 
consideration to the interests and values of all concerned. This process of construction 
is thereby, indeed, the construction of a moral ‘we-perspective’ – an expression 
Lindahl himself also keenly uses for his own account – of human beings engaged in 
joint action in a concrete society (Habermas 1990, pp. 62-68; 1993, pp. 48-54; 2003, 
pp. 256-261). Habermas thereby forcefully rejects the Kantian image of law as simply 
a ‘positivization’ of given moral norms (Habermas 1996, pp. 105-106). Legal rational-
ity is not ‘substantial’ and ‘top down’. Legal discourse, just like moral discourse, is a 
‘constructive’ and ‘bottom up’ process whereby people start from real situations and 
real problems in their actual societies and try to come up with ‘local’ solutions.  
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In this respect, it is also strange to claim, as Lindahl does, that Habermas would 
not be aware of the ‘non-reciprocal origin of reciprocity’. Habermas does not – pace 
Lindahl – face the ‘quandary’ of explaining ‘how practical discourse gets started in 
the first place’ (p. 236). The lifeworld we are born in is contingently given. Discourse 
starts as soon as someone says ‘no’ to given practices and challenges existing norms 
because he or she feels that they are no longer justifiable. And although the commu-
nicative structures inherent in the lifeworld thereby reveal the possibility of changing 
this lifeworld on the basis of a reciprocal form of reasonable discourse, this inherent 
possibility remains a counterfactual ideal which is never fully realized. In this sense, 
our actual life world is indeed characterized by all sorts of asymmetry and non-
reciprocity and the ideal of reciprocity remains, precisely, that: an ideal. Reciprocity 
is never given, but only promised in the ‘future-oriented character, or openness, of the 
democratic constitution’ (Habermas 2001a, p. 774, quoted by Lindahl on p. 236). 
 
3. Legal discourse remains open-ended 
 
Of course, when Lindahl talks about the non-reciprocal origin of reciprocity, he is not 
only concerned with the non-reciprocal starting point of deliberation. His main con-
cern is conceptually more sophisticated. Although he emphasizes that he does not re-
ject the idea of reciprocity as such, Lindahl is keen to emphasize what he calls ‘the 
blind spot’ of reciprocity: the fact that all legally institutionalized forms of reciprocity 
are always necessarily also based on some form of exclusion (p.238-239). He believes, 
therefore, that the idea of reciprocity understood as an ideal of reasonable discourse 
implies a misguided and impossible attempt to ‘achieve unity in the sense of all-
inclusiveness’ (p. 231). The idea of reciprocity understood in terms of a reversibility of 
perspectives would, thereby, ‘transform a politics of inclusion into a politics of assimi-
lation’ (p. 232). In other words, discourse theory is blind to the fact that  
acts of boundary-setting which institute relations of reciprocity are also al-
ways exposed to being a form of domination because they bring about and enforce 
relations or reciprocity. (p. 239) 
The charge that discourse theories of law and morality lead to forms of assimilat-
ing closure is not new. Nevertheless, this criticism is not as obviously warranted as 
the critics assume. As emphasized by Seyla Benhabib (1992, pp. 158-169), for in-
stance, the point of discourse theory is precisely to take seriously the other as a con-
crete other with her own needs, values and concerns. There is, in this sense, much 
more ‘contingency’ involved in the construction of a moral we-perspective than usual-
STEFAN RUMMENS 
986 
 
ly recognized. Again, discourse starts from specific problems and misgivings of actual 
and particular human subjects. The process of deliberation is not meant to make ab-
straction of this particularity, but aims rather to find a way of combining or reconcil-
ing the specific needs of the one with the different needs of the other. It is precisely 
because only the people concerned themselves are capable of knowing and expressing 
their own needs and concerns that discourse theory emphasizes the need for actual de-
liberation rather than advocatory deliberation by some experts or philosophers. The 
actual perspectives of real people are the ineliminable and constitutive elements of 
the we-perspective under construction. This means, in the terminology used by 
Habermas, that the specific content of the moral we-perspective will always be ‘col-
ored’ by contingent personal and cultural ‘ethical’ elements (Habermas 1998, p. 225). 
The precise interpretation of the freedom of religion, for instance, can and will legiti-
mately differ from one country to the next, precisely because the specific interpreta-
tion of this freedom will depend upon the specific history and the specific cultural, so-
cial and economic circumstances of the legal order concerned. In contrast with 
Lindahl’s assumption, discourse theory is not geared towards the elimination of the 
‘strangeness’ of the other. Recognizing the other as a concrete other means for 
Habermas, in terms that Lindahl himself would have to endorse (pp. 247-248), the in-
clusion of the other as a stranger. 
The ‘inclusion of the other’ means rather that the boundaries of the commu-
nity are open for all, also and most especially for those who are strangers to one 
another and want to remain strangers. (1998, p. xxxvi) 
Chantal Mouffe has criticized discourse theory for working with an ideal of a rec-
onciled society in which all genuine conflict is overcome. Habermas emphasizes, of 
course, that the ideal of a reasonable discourse leading to consensus is a counterfactual 
ideal. But, Mouffe argues, the gap between actual and ideal discourse is thereby un-
derstood in merely ‘empirical’ terms. If only enough time were available, the ideal of 
an overall consensus could, in principle, be achieved in some future moment in time. 
Mouffe argues that Habermas therefore mistakenly conceives of full reconciliation or 
full reciprocity as a conceptual possibility. In response, Mouffe claims that the gap 
between the actual and the ideal should be understood as an ontological gap and the 
idea of a full reconciliation as an ontological impossibility (Mouffe 2000, pp. 48, 88, 
98, 137).  
Whether or not Habermas would agree with the claim that he understands the 
counterfactual nature of ideal discourse in merely ‘empirical’ terms, is not entirely 
clear. It is true that in some of the earliest formulations of his discourse theory of eth-
ics, he assumes the possibility of an at least sufficient if not an actual realization of 
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the ideal presuppositions of rational speech (Habermas 1990, p. 92; 1984, pp. 179, 
528; 1993, pp. 55–56). In his later work, on the other hand, he explicitly takes the op-
posite position by clearly stating that these presuppositions should not be ‘hyposta-
tized into the ideal of a future condition in which a definitive understanding has been 
reached’. The ideal of an intact intersubjectivity ‘(…) must not be filled in as the to-
tality of a reconciled form of life and projected into the future as a utopia.’ 
(Habermas 1992, pp. 144–145) 
A full analysis of whether or not Habermas himself recognizes the ‘ontological’ 
nature of the impossibility of a reconciled society, is beyond the scope of the present 
contribution. At this point in the argument, it suffices to say that I personally believe 
that an adequate discourse theory of law and morality could and should recognize the 
‘ontological’ nature of the gap between the actual and the ideal and, thus, recognize 
the essentially open-ended nature of all moral and legal discourse (Rummens 2007, 
2008). This ‘ontological’ open-endedness automatically follows, in my view, from the 
historical nature of the contingent ‘ethical’ elements which are necessarily always 
present in every actual interpretation of the moral we-perspective. Here, Habermas 
himself talks about the ‘existential provinciality vis-à-vis the future’ (Habermas 
2003, pp. 245–246, 259) of all moral norms. Precisely because the specific needs and 
values of all people concerned are contingent and historical, every specific interpreta-
tion of the requirements of reciprocity will necessarily remain contingent and open to 
future changes in view of changing personal and historical circumstances. Because 
discourse theory aims to take seriously the concreteness and contingency of individu-
als in the lifeworld, full reconciliation and full reciprocity are necessarily always post-
poned in infinitum. 
In this context, Habermas – or, at least, Habermasians such as myself – could 
endorse much of what Lindahl says about the non-reciprocal element present in all 
actual legal norms. 
To positivize human rights in a global legal order requires a non-reciprocal 
act that seizes the initiative to determine the concept of humanity for legal pur-
poses, to limit that which is germane from a legal perspective as constituting our 
‘common humanity’. And this non-reciprocal seizure entails a preferential differ-
entiation concerning relevant and irrelevant practical possibilities, with a view to 
fixing what defines us, the members of a global polity, as human beings. This 
preferential differentiation calls forth the possibility of irreducible conflict about 
what constitutes the humanity of human beings. (p. 242) 
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Although Lindahl makes a distinction between (‘pre-positive’) moral human 
rights and positive legal rights which is alien to Habermas2, the core idea expounded 
here holds within the Habermasian framework for moral and legal norms alike: every 
actual moral and legal norm provides a specific determination of the concept of a free 
human being which remains contingent in the sense that it is colored by the specific 
historical contingency of the collective ‘we’ that makes the determination and in the 
sense that it necessarily remains open to future contestation. 
 
 
4. Listening to strangers 
 
As I have tried to show in the previous sections, discourse theory allows for much 
more contingency than its critics are usually willing to grant. Interestingly, the 
recognition of contingency in discourse theory even extends – to a limited degree – to 
the normative core of the theory.  Here, Habermas himself, for instance, identifies the 
‘dogmatic’ core of the discourse theory of law in terms of the idea of autonomy. 
Certainly, this [proceduralist] understanding [of law], like the rule of law it-
self, retains a dogmatic core: the idea of autonomy according to which human be-
ings act as free subjects only insofar as they obey just those laws they give them-
selves in accordance with insights they have acquired intersubjectively. 
(Habermas 1996, pp. 445-446) 
Although in his earlier works, he still tried to provide a transcendental justifica-
tion of his discourse theory, the later Habermas goes so far as to acknowledge that 
there is a moment of choice – albeit a choice without alternatives – involved in our 
commitment to the possibility of normative justification and the idea of freedom. 
Yet this ‘resolve to freedom’ [‘Entschluβ zur Freiheit’] is not up to us because 
the moral language game that is inscribed in the communicative form of life could 
not be maintained in any other way. (Habermas 2003, p. 249) 
Lindahl similarly acknowledges that his theory is a normative theory. The theory 
of a-legality does not lead to a form of relativism but rather to a form of ‘non-
relational obligation’ to the outside. 
                                           
2 For Habermas, human rights should similarly be understood in a constructivist manner as on-
ly temporary and fallible interpretations, see Habermas 2001b, pp. 120-121. 
Contingency and Reason: Some Habermasian Reflections on A-Legality 
 
 
989 
Most generally, this non-relational obligation involves introducing a certain 
forbearance or restraint into the process of setting the boundaries of (il)legality, 
such that the first-person plural perspective of the collective questioned by the 
strong dimension of a-legality is not rendered absolute. (p. 249) 
The non-relational obligation of restraint thereby does not aim to include or as-
similate the outside but rather to safeguard it as it is. 
A politics of a-legality can only respond to unorderable normative claims by 
acknowledging that they belong to an outside which it ought to safeguard as an 
outside. (p. 254) 
Although these normative concerns seem laudable, I want to end my contribution 
by raising two questions in their regard.  
First of all, it remains somewhat unclear where this normative concern comes 
from. Lindahl suggests that it directly follows from his analysis of the contingent na-
ture of legal orders, in the sense that ‘the finite questionability and finite responsive-
ness of a legal collective’ ‘entails’ both a relational obligation towards what is part of 
the legal order as well as the aforementioned non-relational obligation of forbearance 
towards what resists inclusion (p. 249). It is hard to see, however, why an analysis of 
the contingency of legal orders would imply such a positive obligation towards the 
outside. Here, the situation resembles the situation of relativism as a metaethical po-
sition. As argued by Kim and Wreen (2003), a theoretical endorsement of relativism 
implies neither a moral commitment to tolerance nor a commitment to intolerance. 
Similarly, Lindahl’s analysis of a-legality and the necessarily contingent nature of 
every legal order proceeds on a descriptive meta-level that does not seem to ‘entail’ 
any moral commitments either way. As Lindahl himself recognizes in his subsequent 
discussion of the Schmittian concept of the exception as a way of dealing with a-
legality, the response towards what is outside could go in two very different direc-
tions. 
On this reading, exceptional measures are the common root of boundary-
setting undertaken either to neutralize and destroy, or to preserve and sustain, 
what radically questions the legal collective. (p. 251) 
Lindahl clearly opts for the preservation rather than the neutralization of what is 
outside, but why? Of course, he does not necessarily have to provide us with an an-
swer. Ultimate justifications of our moral commitments are probably chimaeras. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that, here too, Lindahl seems to find himself in the same 
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boat as the Habermasians, ultimately having to rely on a – dare we say – ‘dogmatic’ 
commitment to ‘preservation’.  
My second question concerns the precise nature of Lindahl’s notion of restraint. 
In a passage quoted earlier, he criticized discourse theory for failing to recognize that 
‘acts of boundary-setting which institute relations of reciprocity are also always ex-
posed to being a form of domination’ (p. 239). Here, the concern for the outside seems 
to be a concern about a possible ‘domination’ of what is outside. But what is the op-
posite here of ‘domination’? Isn’t that necessarily some form of ‘recognition’ and ‘in-
clusion’? Of course, Lindahl emphasizes that the outside should be safeguarded ‘as an 
outside’. Nevertheless, in order to safeguard the outside – by means of a ‘dialogue’, as 
he stresses – some kind of ‘relation’ towards the outside seems to be inevitable. 
Lindahl seems to be very much aware of the paradoxical nature of safeguarding the 
outside as an outside and struggles for words. He talks about a ‘hiatus – a relation and 
a non-relation – between the own and the strange’ (p. 255) and about the dialogue as 
‘a dia-logos, that is, a rationality of the in-between’ (p. 255). Although I am not un-
sympathetic to these formulations and concerns, it seems strange that Lindahl refuses 
to bite the bullet here and admit that a (non-)relation with the outside remains a rela-
tion nonetheless. In order to ‘preserve’ the outside from ‘domination’, we have to es-
tablish a dialogical relationship allowing us to – why not – ‘include’ the other as, in 
Habermas’ words, ‘a stranger who wants to remain a stranger’.  
It seems to me that Lindahl is struggling here with some kind of dilemma. On the 
one hand, he aims to portray the outside as some kind of ‘radical’ and ‘strange’ out-
side that escapes the categorizations of our ‘own’ order. At one point, he thereby sug-
gests, using an expression of Emilios Christodoulidis, that the complaint about our le-
gal order expressed by the other through his a-legal actions manifests itself as an ‘ob-
jection that cannot be heard’ (p. 183). Of course, the problem with an objection that 
cannot be heard is… that it cannot be heard… and therefore not be taken into ac-
count in any way. Here the radically strange threatens to become the radically in-
commensurable which simply cannot enter or ‘irrupt’ into our own legal order. On the 
other hand, however, the acknowledgment that the stranger should be able to mean-
ingfully manifest herself in some kind of (non-)relational dialogue already implies an 
acknowledgment of some minimal kind of commonality whereby we at least recognize 
each other as human beings, able to speak, and, in our vulnerability, always threat-
ened by the possibility of domination. 
I believe, and there are passages in Habermas along the same lines, that this min-
imal kind of moral commonality is what ultimately lies at the bottom of our moral 
and legal orders alike. Here, I strongly disagree with Lindahl’s critique of Benhabib, 
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when he argues that our dialogue with a would-be immigrant is necessarily a political 
and not a moral one. 
(…) how can I enter into a moral dialogue with you about whether you may 
become a member of our polity, now or in the future? After all, the whole point of 
the dialogue is political: you request to join ‘our association’, not an association in 
general. When providing you with reasons to this effect, I act as a member of the 
community, not as a human being. Accordingly, our dialogue is asymmetrical 
(…) To overcome this asymmetry, you must invoke a right to membership of 
some kind contained in or implied by the schedule of rights enacted by the politi-
cal community to which I belong, not the fact that you and I are human beings. 
(pp. 245-246) 
This is a strange passage because, in contrast with what this fragment suggests, a-
legality refers precisely to a situation in which the stranger, as an outsider, cannot 
possibly invoke the existing legal order and the rights ‘contained in or implied by’ 
them to make her case. The stranger is a stranger to this legal order. If she wants to 
make a claim, it is a claim from the outside of the existing, positivized set of rights as 
they exist. But precisely because she is a human being with a human face, able to 
speak, she is able – through her a-legal actions – to morally challenge the forms of (le-
gal) domination and exclusion she is being subjected to. 
As Habermas has argued: 
Each must be able to recognize him- or herself in all that wears a human face. 
To keep this sense of humanity alive and to clarify it (…) is certainly a task from 
which philosphers should not feel themselves wholly excused, even at risk of hav-
ing the dubious role of a ‘purveyor of meaning’ attributed to them. (Habermas 
1992, p. 15) 
This kind of quote will probably worry Lindahl because he believes that all refer-
ence to ‘humanity’ is already exclusionary in itself. I think this worry is mistaken 
precisely because ‘humanity’ is, for Habermas, not a ‘substantial’ and ‘top down’ 
concept, but rather a concept the meaning and content of which are constantly at 
stake in our open-ended moral and legal ‘dialogue’. 
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